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Rainey: Negligence Per Se in South Carolina: The Effect Given in Civil Ac

NEGLIGENCE PER SE IN SOUTH CAROLINA:
THE EFFECT GIVEN IN CIVIL ACTIONS TO THE
VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTES
An increasingly important phase of tort litigation is the effect of
the violations of criminal statutes and ordinances in determining civil
liability. As the number of motor vehicles on our highways grows,
the more need there is for regulation of traffic by statutes and
ordinances to provide safe travel. Similarly, with our increasing
industrial growth, there is a corresponding increase in need for
safety regulations in this field. The result is that the application of
these statutes and ordinances in civil litigation is becoming a routine
rather than an unusual occurrence.
In a discussion of the problems arising out of these situations,
it is well to point out that the precise language of the statute involved is very important in determining how the statute is to be
applied. Some statutes contain provisions as to civil liability which,
of course, will control over any prevailing general rule as to the
effect to be given statutory violations. Even in the case of statutes
which only provide for criminal penalties, there is variation in the
particular urgency of the purposes of such statutes which could conceivably have an effect on their application in civil actions. Due to
the infinite number of statutes of various types, only the general
effect of criminal statutes with no controlling provisions for civil
liability will be dealt with in this note.
Once a criminal statute containing no provisions for civil liability
has been found applicable to a given case, there are two main effects
given to a violation of such a statute on the issue of negligence by
the courts. The majority rule is that such a violation is negligence
as a matter of law or negligence per sel while the minority view
treats such a violation as merely evidence of negligence or prima
facie negligence.Under the majority view, the issue of negligence in violating a
statute is taken from the jury.
However, this does not mean that the question of ultimate liability
1. E. g., Cosby v. Flowers, 249 Ala. 227, 30 So. 2d 694 (1947) ; Satterlee
v. Orange Glenn School District, 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P. 2d 279 (1947); Mundy
v. Pire-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S. W. 2d 587 (1947).
2. E. g., McKenzie -. Friel, 326 Ill. App. 258, 61 N. E. 2d 407 (1945);
Sithko v. Jastrzebski, 68 R. I. 207, 27 A. 2d 178 (1942) ; Roberts v. Neil, 138
Me. 105, 22 A. 2d 135 (1941).
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is taken from the jury, since it still must be shown that this negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury. Also, such an act of negligence
is subject to the same defenses as a common law act of negligence
such as contributory negligence. 3
The minority view as to the effect of these statutory violations,
that they are only evidence of negligence or prima facie evidence
of negligence, still permits the case to be sent to the jury on the
issue of negligence solely on the basis of the statutory violation but
does not make such a violation conclusive on the issue. Thus, the
defendant can introduce evidence showing due care upon which the
jury can find that he was in fact not negligent in spite of the violation of the statute. The merits of each of these theories can be
argued at length, 4 but since the South Carolina Supreme Court has
upheld with few variations the majority rule that a statutory violation is negligence as a matter of law,5 this discussion will be confined to the problems arising out of the application of this rule in
South Carolina.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has generally held from the
earliest cases, with the possible exception of the cases under the
Pure Food Statute, that the violation of a statute or ordinance is
negligence per se or negligence as a matter of law. The first cases
in which the rule was applied involved the violation of the crossing
signal statutes by railroads.6 Later, in Dyson v. Southern Ry., the
violation of a local speeding ordinance was declared to be negligence per se upon the authority of these crossing signal cases. Mr.
Justice Gary, dissenting, thought that the signal statute cases were
distinguishable since these statutes were capable of exact compliance
by erection of blowposts at the proper distance from the crossing,
but in case of speeding ordinances, the railroad had no exact means
of being sure of compliance except by running well under the
speed limit. This distinction has never been followed, however, and
today the Court generally declares nearly all statutory violations
in civil actions to be negligence per se or negligence as a matter of
law.
The fact that a violation of a statute or ordinance is proven does
not mean it is negligence in every situation.8 Before a violation of a
3. Watson v. Sprott, 135 S. C. 362, 126 S. E. 488 (1925).
4. Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COL. L.
Rv.21 (1949).
5. McBride v. A. C. L. R. R., 140 S. C. 260, 138 S. E. 803 (1927) ; Cirsosky
v. Smathers, 128 S. C.358, 122 S. E.864 (1924).
6. Strother v. So. Ca. & Ga. R. R.. 47 S. C. 375, 25 S. E. 272 (1896).
7. 83 S. C. 354, 65 S. E. 344 (1909).
8. See cases cited in notes 10 and 11 infra.
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statute is declared negligence per se, two other factors must be shown.
First, it must appear that the injury to the plaintiff was of the type
which the statute was designed to guard against, 9 and second, that
the plaintiff was within the class of persons intended to be protected
by the act.' 0 If these factors do not appear, it is dear that the plaintiff gains no rights under the statute and no new duties are placed
on the defendant which were not existent at common law. In Lancaster v. City of Columbia,32 where an action was brought for personal injuries resulting from the plaintiff's stumbling over a defect
in the sidewalk, the city set up as a defense of contributory negligence the fact that the plaintiff was violating a city ordinance requiring persons to walk on the right hand side of the sidewalk. The
Court held the ordinance was inapplicable since it manifestly was to
prevent collisions and there was no collision involved here.' 2 Also, in
Smoak v. Martin,.a the Court held that a party could claim no right
from a statute requiring autos to travel on the right hand side of the
road where, while traveling on the left hand side of the road himself, he Tan into a car parked on the left hand side of the road and
headed in the same direction. The statute was said to be only for the
protection of autos coming from the opposite direction.' 4 Therefore, in
both of these cases even though there was a violation of a statute
or an ordinance, it did not affect the rights of the parties, since in
the first case, the injury was not of the type the ordinance was designed to guard against, and in the second case, the party claiming
the right was not within the class of persons protected by the statute.
In early cases in some jurisdictions, the courts have construed
statutes and ordinances strictly in determining whether they were
applicable in civil actions. In Chase v. N. Y. Cent. R. R.,5 a 1911
Massachusetts case, the court held that parties riding in an unregistered auto could not recover from the defendant railroad for
damages sustained in a crossing collision in which the railroad failed
to give the statutory signals. The reason given was that the signal
statute was entitled "An Act for the Better Protection of Travelers
at Railroad Crossings", and since the plaintiff's auto was unregistered,
9. Lancaster v. City of Columbia, 104 S. C. 288, 88 S. E. 463 (1916).
10. Smoak v. Martin, 108 S. C. 472, 94 S. E. 869 (1918).
11. 104 S. C. 288, 88 S. E. 463 (1916).
12. See Young v. City of Camden, 187 S. C. 414, 198 S. E. 45 (1938);
Jeffords v. Florence County, 165 S. C. 15, 162 S. E. 574, 81 A. L. R. 313 (1932).
13. Smoak v. Martin, 108 S. C. 472, 94 S. E. 869 (1918).
14. See Wright v. South Carolina Power Co., 205 S. C. 327, 31 S. E. 2d
904 (1944) ; Cirsosky v. Smathers, 128 S. C. 358, 122 S. R. 864 (1924) ; Hutto
v. Southern Ry., 100 S. C. 181, 84 S. E. 719, L. R. A. 1915D 962 (1915).
15. 208 Mass. 137, 94 N. E. 377 (1911).
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they did not have the status of "Travelers" within the meaning of
the statute. This is an extreme holding and is clearly not the law in
South Carolina. 16 Even in the earlier cases, the South Carolina
Court has tended to construe such statutes and ordinances liberally.
In the 1910 case of Lindler v. Southern Ry. 17 the South Carolina
Court went nearer to the opposite extreme from that of the Chase
case. In that case, the defendant had parked a train partially blocking
a street crossing in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the stopping of a train on any such crossing under the penalty of a fine. The
plaintiff was injured as he was attempting to pass through the unblocked part of the crossing when the defendant's train emitted
steam without warning, causing loud noises which frightened the
plaintiff's horse. The defendant argued with apparent logic that the
horse was clearly not frightened by the blocking of the crossing in
violation of the ordinance but solely by the emission of steam by
the parked train. Hence, the technical violation of the statute was
immaterial and the real question would be whether the emission of
steam was negligence. The Court through Justice Gary said that
the emission of steam was incidental to the operation of an engine
and could not be considered apart from the violation of the ordinance.
The purpose of this ordinance would seem to be merely to prevent
the obstruction of the streets and injuries caused thereby. The Court
was probably influenced by the fact that there is strong evidence for
finding the defendant to be negligent apart from the ordinance violation. At the time of this case, carelessly making loud noises such
as this in close proximity to a public street could reasonably have
been foreseen to have frightened a horse.
In Bell v. A. C. L. R. R.18 the Court affirmed a verdict for actual
damages sustained when the plaintiff was struck by a piece of planking kicked up by a passing train at a railroad crossing. The plaintiff
alleged as negligence among other things the violation of a statute
requiring railroads to fill in around the rails at grade crossings so
as to provide a safe and easy passage across the tracks. A piece of
the planking used for the filling had apparently been loose even
though the defendant's station master had inspected it shortly before
the accident and had not noticed any defect. The defendant argued
that since the plaintiff was not using the crossing but only standing
near it and watching the passing train, he was not within the class
of persons the statute was intended to protect. The majority of the
16. Cirsosky v. Smathers, 128 S. C. 358, 122 S. E. 864 (1924).

17. 84 S. C. 536, 66 S. E. 995 (1910).

18. 202 S. C. 160, 24 S. E. 2d 177 (1943).
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Court in a 4 to 1 decision held that there was evidence from which
the jury could find that the plaintiff intended to use the crossing as
soon as the train passed and therefore was within the protected class.
In this case also, there might have been common law liability, without the statute, for negligently allowing loose planking to be left near
the tracks in a vicinity where people would likely be injured if
such planking were kicked up by the train.
However, in the case of Hutto v. Southern Ry.' 9 the only act of
negligence alleged against the railroad was a violation of the signal
statute requiring the trains to blow their whistles 500 yards from
a public crossing. The plaintiff alleged that he was unhitching his
plow horse in a field a short distance from the crossing when the
train came by unexpectedly and frightened the horse causing the
plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court reversed a verdict for the
plaintiff on the grounds that since he was not using the crossing,
he was not within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. It was pointed out that even though the statute had been construed to guard against injuries caused by the frightening of horses
as well as collisions,20 it would be extending it too far to construe it
to protect persons not using the crossing. The Court reasoned that
if the statute protected this party although he was not using the
crossing, it might just as well be construed to protect a person anywhere along the track. It would not be reasonable to place on the
railroad a duty to such persons.
These cases seem to show a liberality by the South Carolina Court
in construing these statutes to apply, especially when the surrounding
circumstances indicate a just result.
Even if a party has violated an apparently applicable statute or
ordinance, he may still escape liability by showing his conduct was
excusable under the circumstances. 2 1 In Walker v. Lee, 2 2 one of the
leading cases in the United States on this point, the South Carolina
Court went so far as to hold that a party is bound to violate such
a statute or ordinance if by doing so he can avoid inflicting injury
to person or property. In that case, while driving on the right hand
side of the road in compliance with the statute, the plaintiff collided
with the defendant who was driving on the wrong side of the road.
The Court decided that the plaintiff was not free of contributory
19. 100 S. C.181, 84 S. E. 719, L. R. A. 1915D 962 (1915).

20. Spears v. A. C. L. R. R., 92 S. C. 297, 75 S. E. 498 (1912).

21. Walker v. Lee, 115 S. C. 495, 106 S. E. 682 (1921); Sims v. Eleazer,

116 S. C. 41, 106 S. F_ 854 (1921).

22. Ibid.
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negligence just because he was on the right side of the road but that
if he could have, by using due care, avoided the collision by swerving to the left, he was bound to do so.
Once it has bzen decided that there has been a violation of an applicable statute without legal justification, it still remains to be determined whether such a violation was the proximate cause of the
injuries sustained, just as it would be if common law negligence
was involved. 2 3 Justice Cothran, in one of the leading cases on this
question in South Carolina,2 4 said that the only difference in an act
which is negligence per se and an ordinary act of negligence is in the
. . particular branch of the legal machinery of the trial which
adjudicates the question and characterizes the act; in the one case,
the judge, and in the other the jury." The proximate cause question
was said to be unaffected by the distinction. This rule has been followed in numerous cases and is without a doubt the law in South
Carolina. Since the manner of determining the proximate cause of
an injury is generally the same in the case of statutory violations as
it is in the case of common law negligence, discussion of this point
will be limited to a few variations.
One factor considered in a few cases by the South Carolina Court
in determining if an injury is proximately caused by the violation of
a statute, which is necessarily not present in the case of common
law negligence, is whether the injury is of the type the statute was
designed to guard against by the legislature. Analytically, this consideration would seem out of place on this issue, since if the injury
was not of such type, the statute should not be applicable in the first
place. 2 5 Nevertheless, the Court in one case discussed this factor
in deciding the proximate cause issue without even questioning the
applicability of the statute to the case. 2 6 Also, where there is a collision at a railroad crossing, and it is shown that the railway signal
statute has been violated, the Court has said that since this is exactly
the type of injury the statute was designed to protect against, there
arises a presumption that the failure of the railroad to give the required signals was the proximate cause of the injury.2 7 An examination of a few of these cases might help explain this peculiarity.
23. Chapman v. Associated Transport, Inc., 218 S. C. 554, 63 S. E. 2d 465
(1951); Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S. C. 500, 20 S. E. 2d 153, 141 A. L.
R. 1010 (1942) ; Locklear v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 193 S. C. 309, 8 S. E.
2d 321 (1940).
24. Cirsosky v. Smathers, 128 S. C. 358, 363, 122 S. E. 864 (1924).
25. Lancaster v. City of Columbia, 104 S. C. 288, 88 S. E. 463 (1916).
26. Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S. C. 267, 37 S. E. 2d 737 (1946).
27. McBride v. A. C. L. R. R., 140 S. C. 260, 138 S. E,. 803 (1927) ; Strother
v. So. Ca. & Ga. R. R., 47 S. C. 375, 25 S. E. 272 (1896).
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28
The case of Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. involved a
collision between an automobile and one of the defendant's buses
which was stopped oil a highway in violation of a statute. The sole
issue was whether the bus driver's negligence in violating the statute
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The Court in considering the surrounding circumstances of the collision decided that
since the bus had been parked in a depression on the highway with
the lights of another parked bus facing in the direction of approaching automobiles and further obstructing the driver's vision, it was
reasonably foreseeable that an oncoming automobile might perhaps
negligently collide with tile parked bus. The Court further said:
Our present decision is buttressed by the further consideration
that the unfortunate accident before us is just such as it must
have been anticipated (by the framers of the requirements of
flares and of parking or stopping off the traveled portion of the
highway) would be prevented by observance of the regulations.
This is helpful in the solution of the problem of proximate

cause....

29

The Court seemed to base this reasoning on a quotation from McBride v. A. C. L. R. R.30 which in turn was quoting from Ruling
Case Law.3 ' The pertinent portion is as follows: "If the very injury
has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute law,
that injury must be considered as directly caused by the non-observance of the law." This statement also appears in American Juris32

prudence.

In the McBride case, the Court used this same quotation from
Ruling Case Law in sustaining a lower court jury charge to the
effect that in the case of a railroad crossing collision, where there
was a violation of the statute requiring trains to ring a bell or blow
a whistle upon approaching a crossing,33 there arises a presumption
that the statutory violation was the proximate cause of the injuries
sustained. This statute was declared inapplicable to the case on
another ground but the Court discussed in detail the cases establishing this presumption. This presumption was first stated in Strother
v. So. Ca. & Ga. R. R.34 with no authority or reasoning given to
support it. After stating this rule the Court in that case went on to
28. 208 S. C. 267, 37 S. E. 2d 737 (1946).

Id at 277, 37 S. E. 2d at 741.
140 S. C. 260, 138 S. E. 803 (1927).
20 R. C. L., Negligence § 37 p. 43-44 (1918).
38 Aii. JuR., Negligence § 166 p. 838 (1941).
33. CoDm oF LAWS OF SOuTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 58-743.
34. 47 S. C. 375, 25 S. E. 272 (1896).

29.
30.
31.
32.
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follow Wragge v. So. Ca. & Ga. R. R. 3 5 in construing the language
contained in the signal statute, "that such neglect contributed to
the injury", so as not to require the plaintiff to show that the defendant's statutory violation was the proximate cause but only that
said violation contributed to the injury in some way. The WITragge
case holding was subsequently overruled 3 ' but the rule laid down
in the Strother case as to the presumption of proximate cause was
followed by the Court in several cases prior to the McBride case upon
the principle of stare decisis without any further justification being
given.3 7 In the McBride case the Court continued to follow the precedent laid down by these earlier cases but undertook to rationalize
the rule upon the theory that the legislature when passing this statute
evidently considered that injury to person and property was very
likely to occur at a railroad crossing unless such signals were given.
This theory was supported by the above quotations from Ruling Case
Law. The Court said: ". . . the presumption arises that the failure
to give the signals is the proximate cause of the injury, since such
injury is the natural and probable consequence of the failure to give
the signals and is the very injury intended to be prevented by the
statute."38
In a discussion of the reasoning of the Court on this point, it might
be well to look at the source of the quotation from Ruling Case Laic
which seems to be the basic authority for the conclusion. The quoted
language was taken by that encyclopedia from the West Virginia case
of Norman v. Virginia-PocahontasCoal Co.3 9 which involved a violation of a child labor act wherein the plaintiff, an employee of the
defendant and under 14 years old, was suing for the loss of a leg
during the course of his employment. It is significant that in this case,
the court did not hold that a presumption would arise that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury. The court
held that the plaintiff must introduce evidence to prove "that the
injury indeed proceeded from the unlawful employment," and said
nothing to the effect that it was up to the defendant to introduce
evidence showing that the violation was not the proximate cause.
It is also clear that this injury was of the type the legislature intend35. 47 S. C. 105, 25 S. E. 76 (1896).

36. Turbyfill v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 83 S. C. 325, 65 S. E.
278 (1909); Burns v. Southern Ry., 65 S. C. 229, 43 S. R. 679 (1903) ; Bowen
v. Southern Ry., 58 S. C. 222, 36 S. E. 590 (1900).
37. Peeples v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 115 S. C. 115, 104 S. E. 541 (1920);
Lee v. Northwestern R. R., 84 S. C. 125, 65 S. E. 1031 (1909) ; Drawdy v.

Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 78 S. C. 374, 58 S. E. 980 (1907).
38. McBride v. A. C. L. R. R., 140 S. C. 260, 274, 138 S. E. 803, 807 (1927).
39. 68 W. Va. 405, 69 S. R. 857, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 504 (1910).
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ed to prevent. Thus, the Court in the McBride case is actually placing a different construction on the language quoted than did the
court which spoke the language.
In the Ayers case 4 0 where a bus was illegally parked on the highway in such a position as to be nearly invisible to approaching motorists and in the McBride case 4 ' where the train had failed to give the
required signals and had hit a person crossing the tracks, it is not
surprising for the Court to say that these injuries were the things
which the legislature was trying to prevent and that therefore the
statutory violations were more likely to be the proximate causes of
these injuries. It might also be undisturbing when the Court goes so
far as to declare that a presumption arises that these violations were
the proximate cause of the injuries.
However, a violation of such statutes is not always so obviously
the proximate cause of the injury. This is clearly illustrated in the
case of Coleman v. Levkoff. 42 There, the plaintiff admittedly was
driving 18 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. speed zone when he collided with
the defendant's parked car. The court would not direct a verdict for
the defendant on the ground of the plaintiff's admitted contributory
negligence. It is apparent that such a collision is one of the types of
injuries a speeding statute is designed to prevent, but in this case
it does not so logically follow that the violation was the proximate
cause of the collision. The Court pointed out that it could not be said
with any degree of certainty that the collision would not have occurred had the plaintiff been traveling the required 15 m.p.h.
The Court seemed to recognize this difficulty in the case of
Lawrence v. Southern Ry. 43 In that case while violating a speeding
statute, the plaintiff collided with a railroad box car parked partially
blocking the street. The defendant argued the McBride case reasoning,
in that the speeding statute was passed to prevent collisions such as
this and therefore a presumption arose that the plaintiff's violation
was the proximate cause of the injury and would bar his recovery.
In this case, the Court would not accept this argument and held
that no presumption arose. The Court said that the presumption of
proximate cause established in the Strother case4 4 was founded upon
high probability due to the increased number of crossing accidents
after the passing of the signal statute. But the Court also attempted
40. Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S. C. 267, 37 S. E. 2d 737 (1946).
41. McBride v. A. C. L. R. R., 140 S. C. 260, 138 S. E. 803 (1927).
42. 128 S. C. 487, 122 S. E. 875 (1924).
43. 169 S. C. 1, 167 S. E. 839 (1933).
44. Strother v. So. Ca. & Ga. R. R., 47 S. C. 375, 25 S. R. 272 (1896).
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to distinguish the violation of a speeding statute from the violation
of a crossing signal statute in that the former had a much broader
field of coverage and protected a larger class of people. This would
seem to imply that a presumption of proximate cause would still
arise in the case of a violation of a statute intended for the benefit
of a limited class, similar to the signal statute, if the injury was of
the type the statute was passed to guard against. However, the Court
seemed to recognize the deficiency in the above reasoning as evidenced
by their strong rationalization of the holding of the Strothcr case
upon the grounds of high probability, a ground which was not brought
out in the Strother case or in any of the cases following it. This
would clearly be a better ground for giving rise to a presumption
than the reasoning given by the McBride case, and since the Strother
case itself gave no grounds at all for the rule, there would seem to
be little reason to adopt the rationalization of the McBride case over
that of the Lawrence case.
Today, it should be safe to say that one could not likely get the
Court to declare a presumption of proximate cause to arise upon
the violation of a statute, except in the case of a violation of the
signal statute, for the sole reason that the injury sustained was of
the type the statute was intended to prevent. 45 It is a well established
rule, as has been pointed out, that it must be shown that the injury
is of such type before the statute can be applied in the first place,
but once this has been established the plaintiff still must show by
evidence that the injury was proximately caused by the violation
of the statute. To merit the aid of a presumption in this showing,
45. See Jones v. Carpenter, 160 S. C. 401, 158 S. E. 823 (1931), wherein
the following charge was upheld: " 'That the violation of the Criminal Statute
which is designed to promote the safety of travel upon public highways of
this State constitutes negligence per se, and if an injury to person or property
results from such violation, there is a presumption of law that such violation
is the proximate cause of the injury' .

. . . "

[emphasis in original] Carter,

5., speaking for the Supreme Court, held this charge to be non-prejudicial to

the plaintiff. Cothran, J., concurred on the grounds that the italicized phrase in
the charge saved it from error. The Court in Lawrence v. Southern Ry., 169
S. C. 1, 167 S. E. 839 (1933), discussed this case and agreed with Justice
Cothran. In the cases of Tinsley v. Parris, 174 S. C. 412, 178 S. E. 496 (1935)
and Dodenhoff v. Nilson Motor Express Lines, 190 S. C. 60, 2 S. E. 2d 56
(1939) similar charges were upheld on the authority of the above cases. But,
the latest comment of our Court on this point is in the case of Myers v. Evans,
225 S. C. 80, 81 S. E. 2d 32 (1954). In that case Justice Oxner pointed out that
although there was not a presumption of proximate cause arising out of a
traffic statute violation, our Court has sustained a charge like that in Jones v.
Carpenter, stpra, in several cases. But the Justice went on to say: "While we
have held that a charge of this nature with the italicized words added does not
constitute prejudicial error, it is confusing, since if an injury results from the
violation of a statute, there is no room for a presumption. It is, therefore,
better to omit any instruction concerning presumptions in the case of the violation of a highway statute."
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it would probably take a further showing of extrinsic circumstances
such as were discussed in the Lawrence case that would make it more
likely than not that the violation of the particular statute was the
proximate cause of the collision or some other conventional ground
for the application of a presumption.46
As to the effect of the Court's language in the Ayers case 4 7 that
the fact of the injury being of the type the statute was passed to
prevent supported its finding that the violation of the statute proximately caused the injury, it was probably not meant that such a showing was in itself sufficient to base a jury finding that the violation
was the proximate cause. If that were the case, the issue would be
taken from the jury since it is the function of the Court and not
the jury to determine the construction to be placed on a statute. It
is likely that the Court was merely pointing out the justice of the
jury's finding by saying, and correctly so, that this is why we have
statutes.
CIVIL SuITs UNDER THE PURE FOOD STATUTE

Another troublesome area in the application of the negligence per
se rule in South Carolina has arisen in civil suits brought under the
Pure Food Statute4 ' which makes it a misdemeanor for a party to
sell adulterated or unwholesome food. Under the normal application
of the rule, if it is shown that the food or drink contained impurities
and that the defendant manufactured it, then this should be negligence
as a matter of law on the part of the defendant, if it appears that
the plaintiff was within the class of persons protected by the statute
and the injury was of the type the statute was intended to guard
against. The only question left for the jury should be whether the
injury was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. However, confusion has arisen in the South Carolina cases from the use
of such language as "negligence is implied from such violation" or
that such a violation is "prima facie evidence of negligence" and also
from the Court's allowing want of negligence to be shown as a
defense, 4 9 all of which is inconsistent with holding that the violation of a statute is negligence as a matter of law.
The source of this confusion seems to be the case of Tate v.
Maldin5o in which the Court was first faced with a civil action
46. McCoTA. dK, EvmDENc § 309, p. 641 (1954).

47. Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S. C. 267, 37 S. E. 2d 737 (1946).
48. Cone OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 32-1511 et seq.
49. Floyd v. Florence Nehi Bottling Co., 188 S. C. 98, 198 S. E. 161 (1938);
Burnette v. Augusta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S. C. 359, 154 S. R. 645
(1930): Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S. C. 392, 154 S. E. 431 (1930).
50. 157 S. C. 392, 154 S. E. 431 (1930).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1959

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
[Vol. 11
for injuries resulting from adulterated food. There a judgment for
the plaintiff was affirmed for injuries resulting from the plaintiff's
drinking a Coca Cola containing the decayed carcass of a mouse. Although the Court recognized the fact that a violation of the food
statute was shown, the decision was mostly concerned with common
law principles bearing on liability for selling impure food. The Court
quoted extensively from a Tennessee case 5 ' involving similar facts
but in which no mention was made of a pure food act and which
was therefore entirely based on the common law. The quotation
emphasized that "[t] his liability is based on an omission of duty or an
act of negligence, and the way should be left open for the innocent
to escape." The South Carolina Court then received the evidence
introduced by the defendant showing the modern equipment and
sanitation methods employed in the bottling process and the resulting high improbability of an impurity getting into the bottles. It
was pointed out that even if there was no evidence of negligence in
the testimony, the jury could base a verdict for the plaintiff on the
failure to properly inspect the bottles before they left the plant. Also
the jury had visited the plant and could conclude that the defendant
was negligent on the basis of that visit in spite of there being no evidence of negligence. The quotation from the Tennessee court and
the subsequent laborious effort to find in the record evidence of common law negligence of the defendant to support the jury's verdict
strongly implies that the Court held such negligence to be a necessary
element of liability in addition to the violation of the Pure Food
Statute.
The Court also quoted several passages from Corpus Jurlis having
to do with various aspects of common law liability for selling impure
food along with a few having to do with liability under the Pure
Food Statute. The passages having to do with common law negligence
further indicated that acts of negligence other than the violation of
the statute must be shown. 52 In one passage the statement was made
that "[ w] ant of negligence on the part of the defendant is a defense to
an action of trespass on the case for selling unwholesome food,"53
51. Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S. W. 155, L. R.
A. 1916B 877, Ann. Cas. 1917B 572 (1915).
52. "A person who sells articles of food is under a legal duty to exercise
reasonable care to insure their being wholesome and fit for consumption, and
is liable in an action ex delicto on the ground of negligence for any injury resulting from their being unwholesome or unfit if he knew, or by exercise of
reasonable care could have known, their defective condition." 26 C. J., Food 0
90, p. 783 (1921), quoted in Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S. C. 392, 397, 154 S. E.
431,433 (1930).
53. 26 C. J., Food § 100, 1p.787 (1921), quoted in Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S. C.
392, 398, 154 S. E. 431, 433 (1930).
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This statement would seem to indicate clearly that the violation of
the Pure Food Statute is not conclusive on the issue of negligence.
From the statement itself, it is not ascertainable whether it applies
to an action brought under a pure food statute or only to common
law suits. Upon looking at the context of the Corpus Juris section
from which this quotation was taken it will be noted that the case
cited as authority for the proposition 5 4 does not involve the violation of a pure food statute. It will also be noted that the case cited
deals with a suit against a packing company for injuries sustained
by the contracting of trichinosis by the plaintiff from pork packed
by the defendant. The defendant introduced as a defense evidence
showing the following facts: that trichina worms are only visible
under a microscope and such an inspection is impractical and untrustworthy; that no system known to science is reliable for such an
inspection; that the only sure way of eliminating the danger is to
thoroughly cook the pork at a temperature of at least 1400. It was
also shown that it was the policy of the U. S. Government not to
inspect for trichina worms since it would tend to give a false sense
of security to the public and possibly induce laxity in the cooking
precaution. It seems questionable whether this sort of case can be
said to be authority for the broad proposition that want of negligence
is a defense to an action under the violation of a statute which is
held to be negligence per se. Actually, the defendant in that case has
shown the impossibility of compliance with the Pure Food Statute
in the case of trichina worms and further, that the only reliable means
of protection in this case, lies in the hands of the consumer himself:
that is, the thorough cooking of the pork. This would seem to fall
into the line of cases involving justifiable violations of statutes discussed heretofore in this note. It would not seem to warrant permitting the jury to find that a defendant bottling company'was not.
negligent on the ground that it showed evidence of a modern and
sanitary plant in the face of a showing that a contaminated bottle
in fact was sold by the defendant in violation of the Pure Food Act.
The concurring opinion of Justice Carter in the Tate case is helpful
in alleviating the confusion in stating that the selling of the contaminated drink amounted to a violation of the food statute and was
negligence per se and it was not necessary that specific acts of common law negligence be shown by the plaintiff.
The problem raised by the Tate case was further shown in two
similar cases handed down in the same term of court. In one of these
54. Tavani v. Swift & Co., 262 Pa. 184, 105 Adt. 55 (1918).
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cases the Court's holding implied that the violation of the food
statute was merely evidence of negligence or raised a presumption
of negligence while the other case was clearly consistent with the
rule that such a violation is negligence as a matter of law.
The former was the case of Burnette v. Autgusta Coca-ColaBottling
Co.5 5 in which the Court upheld a verdict for the defendant denying
the plaintiff damages resulting from drinking a contaminated Coca
Cola bottled by the defendant. In the charge to the jury, the trial
judge stated as follows:56
We have a statute in this state which makes it a misdemeanor
for any person dealing in drinks sold to the public to allow
through gross negligence any of these things known as deleterious or unsound or putrid. We have a statute that makes such
things a misdemeanor, but the general law is that one who
manufactures or sells an article for public consumption, whether
it be food or drink, must use due care to see that such article
is fit, safe, and proper for human consumption. [emphasis added]
The Court then charged the jury, after rewording a request of
the plaintiff, that negligence per se does not of itself entitle the plaintiff to recover but that it must be further shown that such negligence
proximately caused the injury. This was the substance of the plaintiff's request with a heavier emphasis placed on the proximate cause
element and is a correct statement of the law.
The Court also charged a request of the defendant which first
asserted that a manufacturer of food for public consumption is only
bound to use ordinary and reasonable care to prevent impurities and
is not an insurer of the absolute purity of his product. The remainder
of the charge was as follows :57
.. . So in this case I charge you that you would not be
warranted in finding a verdict against the defendant from the
mere fact that a bug or other insect was found in the bottle
in question, but the plaintiff must go further and prove for your
satisfaction by the greater weight of the evidence, not only that
the bug or insect was in the bottle, but also that its presence in
the bottle was due to the negligence and carelessness of the
defendant, before you can find a verdict for the plaintiff in this
case.
The majority of the Supreme Court held these charges to be
sustained by the decision in the Tate case. Again justice Carter dis55. 157 S. C. 359, 154 S. E. 645 (1930).
56. Id. at 362-363, 154 S. E. at 646.
57. Id. at 366, 154 S. E. at 648.
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agreed and in this case wrote a dissenting opinion on the ground
that the charge stated that the statute prohibited selling impure food
only through "gross negligence" and therefore gave the jury an incorrect impression of the force and application of the statute. He
also pointed out that the statutory violation was negligence per se
and the plaintiff did not have the burden of showing how the impurities got in the bottle nor did he have to show any other act of
negligence on the part of the defendant.
The clear import of the charge taken as a whole would seem to be
that something more than merely the violation of the statute must
be shown and therefore such a violation is merely evidence of negligence or raises a presumption of negligence. However, the majority
of the Court was correct in saying that the charge was sustained by
the opinion in the Tate case as can be seen in the above discussion of
that case.
These two cases would seem to establish an exception to the negligence per se rule in South Carolina if it had not been for the case
of Cidbertson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.a8 which was the third of
the series of cases handed down on this point in the Spring Term of
1930. This case also involved injuries received from drinking a Coca
Cola bottled by the defendant containing deleterious matter. The
jury was charged here that if the defendant violated the Pure Food
Statute, he is liable for all injuries resulting therefrom regardless
of his knowledge of the impurity of his product. The defendant was
said to be bound to know whether his product was sound and complied with the statute. The defendant objected to this charge on the
grounds that it made the manufacturer liable for unavoidable accidents and thus a guarantor of his product. The Supreme Court again
held that this charge was controlled by the decision in the Tate case
and therefore was correct. It seems clear that if the manufacturer is
bound to know whether his product is sound and wholesome when it
leaves the factory, then he is negligent as a matter of law when an
unwholesome product is sold on the market. This case seems to be
the soundest of the three and is in line with the general rule that the
violation of a statute is negligence per se. The later cases seem to
follow this view certainly to the extent that no other acts of negligence are required to submit the case to the jury.
In the case of Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.5 9 the
Court upheld the submission of the issue to the jury where it was
pointed out that there was not a vestige of evidence of negligence
58. 157 S. C. 352, 154 S. E. 424 (1930).
59. 193 S. C. 51, 7 S. E. 2d 641, 127 A. L. R. 1185 (1940).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1959

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1959], Art. 4
LVol.
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QuARUY
Vo1 11
on the part of the defendant other than the violation of the Pure
Food Statute. Although the Court quotes from an earlier case oo that
the violation of the Pure Food Act was prima fade evidence of negligence, which in turn was based on the authority of the Tate case, it
goes on specifically to hold, in line with Justice Carter's concurring
opinion in the latter case and his dissent in the Burnette case to the
effect that the violation of the food statute is negligence per se.
It might be well to point out that this case also reaffirmed a portion
of the troublesome quotation from the Tennessee case as set out
in the Tate case and quoted hereinabove to the effect that the foundation of liability is negligence and it is ". . . based on an'omission of
duty or an act of negligence and the way should be left open for the
innocent to escape." Since, as pointed out above, the Tennessee case
did not involve a pure food statute, the quotation is still ambiguous
as applied to these cases but taking the opinion of the Gantt case as
a whole, the only reasonable meaning that can be given to the passage
is that the word "negligence" includes a violation of the pure food
statute.
In Hobbs v. Carolina Coca-Cola Bottling Co.61 the Court quoted
another of the CorpusJuris sections cited in the Tate case to the effect
that negligence is "implied" from the violation of the Pure Food
Statute.6 2 However, as in the Gantt case, the Court proceeds to state
also that such violation is negligence "per se" or negligence in itself
and the opinion taken as a whole seems to give this impression although the specific issue as to whether the violation was negligence
per se or only implied negligence was not before the Court.
In the case of Boylston v. Armour & Co.,63 which contained the
next comment of the Court on this point, it was said that "[i]n such
cases, proof of common law negligence was unnecessary because of
the established rule that violation of the statute is per se negligence ....
"64 This language, however, was dictum in this case
since the statute was held inapplicable to out-of-state manufacturers.
In McKenzie v. Peoples Baking Co.O5 in 1944 the Court stated
that ". . . evidence of violation of the Pure Food Statute implies
60. Floyd v. Florence Nehi Bottling Co., 188 S. C. 98, 198 S. E. 161 (1938).
61. 194 S. C. 543, 10 S. E. 2d 25 (1940).
62. "If a manufacturer of a food product disobeys the prohibition or neglects

to perform the duty imposed by a pure food statute, negligence is implied
from such violation or neglect, and he is liable for injury resulting from the
unwholesomeness of such food product regardless of his knowledge of its unwholesomeness." 26 C. J., Food § 93, p. 785 (1921).
63. 196 S. C. 1, 12 S. E. 2d 34 (1940).
64. Id. at 10, 12 S. E. 2d at 38.
65. 205 S. C. 149, 31 S. R. 2d 154 (1944).
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negligence and requires submission to the jury of the issue thereby
raised, and that this is true even if the testimony negatives negligence in the manufacture of the food." 6 6
Then the Court went on to say that the Gantt case firmly established that such a violation was negligence per se.
The next case involving the point came up in 1953 in Tedder v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co.67 in which it was held that ". . . the violation of the Pure Food and Drug Act is negligence per se and that a
plaintiff need do nothing more than prove a violation of the said
Act. .... ,,68
But in 1954 in the case of Peters v. Double Cola Bottling Co. of
Colunmbiaoo the Court made the following statement of the rule :70
A violation of this statute [Pure Food] is negligence per se.
*. . Substantially all food products today on sale are either
canned, packaged, or bottled, which means that explanation
for adulteration of food involves information normally within
the control of either the retailer or the manufacturer, and without the knowledge of the consumer. Accordingly there is good
reason for the rule which allows the plaintiff to make out a prima
facie case by showing a violation of the statute. Thereafter, a defendant may adduce evidence to show that there has been, in
fact, no negligence, it being in the last analysis a question for the
jury unless, of course, the evidence is susceptible of only one
reasonable inference. [emphasis added]
It will be noted that this language is clearly dicta since the only
issue on appeal was whether a motion for change of venue was
properly refused.
7
Likewise, in the latest case on the point, Turner v. Wilson, ' the
Court made the following statement: "Under our decisions proof
of the violation of the Pure Food Act, Section 32-1511 et seq. of the
' 72
1952 Code. makes but a prima facie case of negligence." The Gantt,
Tedder and Peters cases were cited as authority for this proposition.
The first thing that appears in an analysis of these cases is that
the terms "negligence per se" and "prima facie negligence" apparently are used interchangeably by the South Carolina Court. In several
of these cases both terms are used without any attempt to distinguish
66. Id. at 153, 31 S. R. 2d at 156.

67. 224 S. C. 46, 77 S. E. 2d 293 (1953).

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 50, 77 S. E. 2d at 295.
224 S. C.437, 79 S. E. 2d 711 (1954).
Id. at 443, 79 S. E. 2d at 713.
227 S. C. 95, 86 S. E. 2d 867 (1955).
Id. at 101, 86 S. E. 2d at 870.
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between them. A possible reason for this is that in none of these
cases would the distinction have a real effect on the result. In the
case of negligence per se, a want of negligence or due care on the
part of the defendant cannot be the basis of a verdict for the defendant since the violation of the statute is in itself negligence. If the
violation of the statute is only prima facie negligence, then the
defendant can be held to be free of negligence upon evidence of
due care. 7 3 But in both cases, the violation of the statute is sufficient
to submit the issue of the defendant's liability to the jury and thus
when the Supreme Court is reviewing the evidence to determine its
sufficiency, one rule is just as good as the other. If the issue was
squarely before the Court, it no doubt could be argued that the Tate
case, through one of its Corpus Juris quotations, said that want of
negligence is a defense to such an action and from that, the rule
must be that a violation of the Pure Food Statute is only prima facie
negligence. This contention is supported by the language of the
Peters case and the Turner case which are the two latest cases on
the point. However, the outcome is doubtful due to the repeated holding of our Court that the violation of a statute is negligence per se
in cases involving other statutes and also in most of the cases involving this statute. Also, as has been pointed out above, this particular
quotation from Corpus Juris is based on very doubtful authority and
probably is not the law in most jurisdictions.
Even though it is doubtful whether the South Carolina Courts
apply the negligence per se rule in its normal sense to violations
of the food statute, the later cases are clearly consistent to the extent
that the South Carolina Court at least holds such a violation to be
prima facie evidence of negligence and that no separate acts of negligence are required to submit the issue to the jury. Yet, portions of
the Tate case and the Burnette case which are inconsistent with this
rule have never been overruled and, in fact, the cases are occasionally
74
cited as being in accord with the accepted rule.
It is, of course, possible to pick and choose from the language of
73. Inthe case of Whaley v. Ostendorff, 90 S. C. 281, 73 S. E.186 (1911)

the Court, in reversing a lower court charge that the violation of a traffic
ordinance was prima facie negligence, pointed out the following: "When evidence of negligence is only prima facie, it is subject to rebuttal, but when there
is negligence per se, it is conclusive of that question. The fact that there is
negligence per se, does not, however, tend to show, that such negligence is
actionable. The question whether negligence is actionable, depends upon the
further question, whether such negligence was the direct and proximate cause
of the injury."

74. See Tedder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 224 S. C. 46, 77 S. . 2d 293
(1953); Hobbs v. Carolina Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 194 S. C. 543, 10 S. R. 2d
25 (1940).
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the Burnette and Tate cases and come out with a correct statement
of the law but parts of these opinions are obviously inconsistent with
either view as to violations of the food statute. For instance, in
Tedder v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 7 5 the Court affirmed the lower
court's refusal to give a charge patterned after that approved in the
Burnette case, quoted hereinabove, without distinguishing or overruling that case.
This was unquestionably correct under the authority of the Gantt
case, since the charge asserted that the plaintiff must show that the
impurity got into the bottles by the defendant's negligence, but it
would have been helpful if the portion of the Burnette case sustaining
this proposition had been overruled.
There are several possible reasons for the confusion resulting from
the application of the negligence per se rule as to violations of the
Pure Food Act. One which was suggested by Judge Lide in the Gantt
case was that the earlier cases over-emphasized the rather meager
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's negligence in an effort to
avoid resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which has been repeatedly held not to be the law in South Carolina, while only incidentally mentioning that the violation of the statute was negligence
per se. Another is that it seems obvious that the Court in the Tate case,
except for Justice Carter, failed to recognize the full significance of a
pure food statute as affecting the common law theories of liability of a
manufacturer of food products. Perhaps an underlying reason for this
apparent oversight could be the hesitancy of courts to hold a manufacturer of foods liable as an insurer or guarantor of his product.
The holding that a violation of a pure food statute is negligence as a
matter of law is a much harsher rule than such a holding in the case
of traffic or similar statutes. The pure food statute does not purport
to prohibit one specific act or omission such as failure to inspect,
screen, disinfect, etc., but simply prohibits the selling of impure,
adulterated foods no matter how such impurities or adulteration came
about. An analogous traffic statute would prohibit drivers from having collisions. However, the broadness of the food statute would not
seem to warrant an exception to the negligence per se rule since the
legislature clearly intended to impose a heavy criminal liability on
food sellers due to the dangerous results which could follow from
selling impure food. If they are criminally liable, there is no reason
why they should not be civilly liable for the injuries proximately
caused by the violation of this statute as they would be in the case
75. 224 S. C. 46, 77 S. E. 2d 293 (1953).
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of the violation of other statutes. Dean Prosser in his treatise on
torts7 0 pointed out that the trend of the law is to hold the manufacturer absolutely liable to the consumer for injuries sustained from
defects in his product. He said that while this result is commonly
obtained by variations of the warranty doctrine, in the case of food
and drugs it can also be reached on a theory of negligence under the
criminal penalties for the sale of defective products which have been
provided by some statutes. That is, some of the statutes are construed to impose an absolute duty not to sell bad food and hence
give rise to strict liability. In support of this proposition, one of the
77
cases cited is the Culbertson case.
Perhaps another of the cases cited in support of the above proposition gives a clearer illustration of the application of this rule. In the
case of Kelly v. John R. Daily Co.,78 a 1919 Montana case, the plaintiffs were injured by eating contaminated pig's feet sold by the defendant. The defendant apparently went into a detailed discussion of
the common law theories upon which defendant's liability could be
based and concluded that the complaint had not stated a cause of
action under any of the said theories. The court said the defendant's
argument was "beside the mark" and would only have been in point
if there had not been a pure food statute in the state. It was said
that when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had sold him impure
food, he, in effect, charged him with a violation of the pure food
statute which was of itself legal negligence. It only remained to be
shown that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury to the
plaintiff. The court went on to say ".... the sale of adulterated
food is absolutely prohibited. The seller is made the insurer of the
purity of the food products sold by him, and guilty knowledge on his
part is no longer an ingredient of the offense." This is the import of
the Culbertson case in South Carolina although it has never been
followed to its logical conclusion by specifically holding that a seller
of food products is a guarantor of the purity of his product. This
does not make the defendant absolutely liable since the common law
defenses to an assertion of negligence are still available to him. He
can show evidence of contributory negligence, intervening acts of
third parties, that the negligence per se was not the proximate cause
and so on. These defenses seem to be more realistic than simply
introducing evidence of a sanitary plant and modern equipment in
an effort to show the impossibility of the impurities getting into the
76. PRossm, TORTS § 84, p. 509 (2d ed. 1955).
77. 157 S. C.352, 154 S. E. 424 (1930).
78. 56 MOnt. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919).
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products. In short, the attitude of the legislature is that if the contamination of the product occurred while it was still in the hands of
the defendant, he should be held liable; but if it occurred thereafter,
he should not. The application of the negligence per se rule given its
normal effect would seem to be the most practical means of achieving
this result. If it is shown that the bottle contained an impurity and
it proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, then the defendant's
only line of escape should be that such impurity got into the bottle
after it left the defendant's hands.
SUMMARY

In summarizing this discussion it can be seen that as a general
rule the violation of a statute or ordinance in South Carolina is held
to be negligence per se. Our Court has not been technical in construing the legislature's objective in passing these statutes and
ordinances and as a result they have been liberally applied in civil
actions.
In the case of a violation of the railroad signal act, the Court has
gone so far as to say that a violation of the statute is not only negligence per se but also gives rise to a presumption that the violation
was the proximate cause of the injury. But in the case of the Pure
Food Act, the Court has been jumping back and forth between the
negligence per se rule and the rule that a violation of a statute or
ordinance is only prima facie negligence. As was pointed out, the
presumption of proximate cause rule has been fairly definitely confined to the violations of the railroad signal act. However, the inconsistency of the Court's holdings under the Pure Food Act is still
a serious problem. To clear up the confusion in the cases on this point,
the South Carolina Court should hold such violations to be negligence per se, and it is likely that the Court will so hold, if the issue
is put squarely before it. Such a holding would be consistent with
the holdings in connection with the violation of other statutes in
South Carolina and would also-be consistent with the trend of the
cases from other jurisdictions, as well as in accord with the views of
the textwriters. There is no good reason for making an exception to
the negligence per se rule in the case of the Pure Food Statute.
F. DEAx RAINZY, JR.
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